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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
they did so only after finding that lOb-5 did not impose a duty to dis-
close on this outside director. This implies that the court was following
the admonition of Judge Hays. Additionally, a statement by Judge
Moore suggests further that the scienter requirement announced in
Lanza is not the sole test for lOb-5 liability.6 0
The precise holding of Lanza is that a director who is a non-
participant in a transaction and who personally makes no misrepresenta-
tions will not be held liable for mere negligence contributing to the
fraud perpetrated upon the other party to the transaction.
The scienter requirement for liability where the defendant is not
directly involved in the transaction is probably a beneficial rule. The
cases in other circuits which have recognized a standard of negligence
have all concerned persons involved in the unlawful transaction in one
way or another. This is certainly far different from imposing liability
on a director who had nothing whatsoever to do with the wrongful
conduct. Whether the Second Circuit will apply a negligence standard
in circumstances other than those presented here remains to be decided.
INSIDE INFORMATION - COMMON LAW LIABILITY
Schein v. Chasen
Insider trading in public securities markets has long been subject
to condemnation.1 In order to combat this undesirable practice, Con-
gress has vested the courts and the SEC with a complete arsenal of
weapons. Of primary significance 2 among these is section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 and rule lOb-5 enacted pursuant
60 See note 24 supra.
1 See 2 L. Loss, SECURtIES RGULAT0oN 1037 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
Such condemnation has not been universal, however. See H. MANNE, INSmER TRADING AND
THE STocK MAmmEr (1966). See also Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. Rxv, 547 (1970), and the authorities cited therein at un,2 & 4, Compare Ferber,
The Case Against Insider Trading: 4 Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. R'v.
621 (1970), with Manne, 4 Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber, 23 VAND, L. REv. 627 (1970).
2 Another formidable weapon for dealing with insider trading is section 16(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 US.C. § 78(p)(b) (1970), Liability under section 16(b) is limited to true in-
siders: directors, officers and controlling (10% or more) shareholders, Any profit made by
such an insider as a result of a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of corporation
securities within a six month period may be recovered by the corporation or by any
security holder on behalf of the company in a quasi-derivative suit. As a streamlined
statute imputing absolute liability, section 16(b) implements the policy that an insider
should not be "playing the market" in his own corporation's securities. See Smolowe v.
DeLendq Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 285-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 US. 751 (1973); Loss, supra
note 1, at 1041 et seq. However, section 16(b) lacks the broad scope of rule 10b.5 and thus
is less effective as a general deterrent to the many varying types of insider trading.
SSection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),
provides:
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thereto.4 The broad language of rule 1Ob-5, 5 aided by the mutually
reinforcing enthusiasm of federal judges and the plaintiffs' bar in their
efforts to eradicate insider trading, has resulted in an extension of the
rule far beyond the ken of the SEC of the 1930's. 7 However, as the
range of conduct proscribed by rule lOb-5 has been extended, enforce-
ment procedures have generated some confusion.8
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
4 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
G Cf. note 3 supra. One commentator has stated that "the broad remedies of Rule
lOb-5 are more desireable for plaintiffs than the express remedies provided by the
1933-34 Acts." Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by
Implication through Rule lOb-5, 59 Nw. U.L Rav. 185, 193 (1964).
6 Recognizing the tremendous growth of these provisions, Mr. Justice Marshall noted,
"10b and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most litigated provision in the Federal Securities
laws." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). Most of this growth has oc-
cured within the past ten years. Between 1942 when lOb-5 was promulgated and 1962,
only fifty-four 10b-5 cases were reported. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under lob-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627, 687-90 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Civil Liability]. Since 1962 the volume has increased to over one hundred cases an-
nually. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delecto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA, L. REV. 597,
598 n.2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Multiple Defendants].
7 See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1393 (1965); Painter, Rule
lob-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 699, 700 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Recodification], where the author comments on the "fascinating morass of federal com-
mon law which has grown up under that benevolent umbrella with the innocuous title
of Rule lOb-5." Id. at 699.
8 A private right of action under rule lOb-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss); 73 F. Supp 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) (decision on the merits); 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (additional findings of
fact and law). The existence of this private cause of action has been attacked as violative
of the congressional intent. See Civil Liability, supra note 6, at 642-60. Professor Ruder's
article provides a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the private action as of 1963.
See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502-03, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,
84-85 (1969), for commentary on the limited nature of the remedies available under l0b-5.
See also Note, A Suggested Locus of Recovery in National Exchange Violations of Rule
lOb-5, 54 CoRN.r L. R v. 306 (1969).
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Since Birnbaum v. Newport Steel,9 the requirement that actions
brought under rule lOb-5 relate to a purchase or sale of securities has
limited individual plaintiffs to those trading in a security prior to dis-
closure of relevant inside information.' 0 Such a limitation"l can often
effectively reduce the number of eligible plaintiffs to zero.12 Those
individuals who are qualified are considered private attorneys-general
for without them the desired deterrent effect of the statute would be
left to the vagaries of SEC action,'13 and the somewhat cumbersome
9 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In Birnbaum the plaintiff
brought suit against a controlling shareholder who sold his stock at greater than market
value thereby breaching his duty to minority shareholders by relinquishing control of the
corporation. Plaintiffs also alleged acts of specific fraud in various misrepresentations made
by the defendant to the minority shareholders. The defendants' conduct, in the plaintiffs'
view, constituted a violation of section 10b and rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit affirmed a district court holding that lob-5 was only to prevent
"fraud perpetrated upon the purchaser or seller" of the security in question. Id. at 463.
Unlike section 16(b), which grants shareholders a cause of action against insiders, see note 2
supra, lob-5 provides a remedy only for those within a narrow class, i.e., the defrauded
purchasers or sellers.
10 Applying the Birnbaum doctrine, see note 9 supra, in the context of trading on a
public stock exchange, a plaintiff must establish that at the time of the fraud he purchased
the particular security. When use of inside information by a defendent is alleged, the
plaintiff must prove his purchase or sale during the period of trading on the inside in-
formation, i.e., the time between defendant's lOb-5 violation and the time of public dis-
closure of the inside information. Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 264, 270-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Hirsh v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283, 1286-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1l In Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325
(U.S. Dec. 3, 1973) (Nos. 73-439, 73-440, 73-495), the period of inside information trading was
only four hours. Only those individuals who purchased or sold shares during that narrow
time span could recover losses under lob-5. See note 10 supra. However, defendants sold
83,000 shares of stock in this brief period. See note 23 infra.
12 The Birnbaum doctine has been the subject of severe criticism. See, e.g., Lowenfels,
The Demise of the Birnbaum: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. Rxv. 268 (1968). For
commentary tracing the history of rule lOb-5 and Birnbaum see Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A
Recent Profile, 13 W. & M.L. REv. 860, 900-26 (1972).
Despite criticism, the Birnbaum doctrine recently has been reaffirmed by the Second
Circuit. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, rev'd and remanded en banc, 453 F.2d 736,
738 (2d Cir. 1972); GAP Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 910 (1972); See also Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1971), where
the court noted that the SEC urged the overruling of Birnbaum and the court declined
the invitation.
13 SEC litigation in this area traditionally sought only injunctive relief. See, e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re
Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). However, the SEC can, as an ancillary remedy,
bring an action to require the insider to disgorge profits due to insider trading. These
profits are then paid to the corporation which holds as trustee "subject to disposition in
such manner as the court might direct upon application from the SEC or other interested
person, or on the court's own motion." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Double liability would be prevented by using
the fund as a primary source to pay any private judgments against the insiders. After a
prescribed period of time had elapsed the proceeds would then be turned over to the
corporation.
1973]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
class action device.14 The inadequacy of these remedial devices has
given rise to a body of common law under which liability for insider
trading may be more readily established.
In 1969, the New York State Court of Appeals in Diamond v.
Oreamuno'5 held that corporate directors who traded on inside infor-
mation breached their common law fiduciary duty" to their corpora-
tion. Further, the court held that the resulting profits could be recov-
ered via a derivative suit without a showing of damage to the
corporation.1'7
In Schein v. Chasen,18 the Second Circuit, per Judge Waterman,
The overriding policy is not to reimburse the corporation but to prevent the insider
from realizing any profit from his wrongdoings. Conceivably the corporation would realize
no benefit, only the burden of administering the trust fund. See note 51 and accompanying
text infra.
14 Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-203).
15 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
1 6 1n finding this duty the court relied heavily on the congressional intent of 16(b) to
prevent abuse of the fiduciary relationship that obligates a director. Although no section
16(b) violation was present in Diamond, the court saw in section 16(b) an underlying
fiduciary duty which could be enforced via a derivative suit. 24 N.Y.2d at 500, 248 N.E.2d
at 913-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83. See Loss, supra note 1, at 1123 et seq. for a discussion of
the relation of section 16(b) and general agency concepts. See also Gower, Investor Protec-
tion in the USA, 15 Moo. L. Rav. 446, 453 (1950), commenting on Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co.,
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1948).
17 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. Diamond generated a
considerable amount of commentary, generally favorable, in view of the decision's deterrent
effect on insider trading. See, e.g., 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1421 (1969); 31 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 296 (1969);
22 VAND. L. Rav. 1412 (1969). However, there was criticism of the "trustee" analogy used to
obviate a showing of damage to the corporation. See 18 BuFF. L. R-v. 193 (1968); 37 FORD.
L. REv. 477 (1968); 23 S.W.L.J. 921 (1969).
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Diamond, noted that there was
a possible harm to the corporation which created "an added element of liability."
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (Ist Dep't 1968):
"The prestige and good will of a corporation... may be undermined by the revelation
that its chief officers had been making personal profits out of corporate events which they
had not disclosed to the community of stockholders." However, neither the appellate
division nor the Court of Appeals relied on this, but instead based the result on the theory
that defendants had unjustly realized profits that they should not in equity be permitted
to retain. "Just as a trustee has no right to retain for himself the profits placed in his
possession but must account to his beneficiaries, a corporate fiduciary, who is entrusted
with potentially valuable information, may not appropriate that asset for his own use even
though, in so doing, he causes no injury to the corporation," 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d
at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The Diamond court's analogy is subject to criticism. A trust
asset which is exploited by a trustee, could have been used to profit the trust. Thus the
trustee's personal gain is a deprivation of the trust. A corporation, however, could not
realistically deal in the asset of corporate inside information or use it to trade in its own
securities. Therefore no corporate opportunity is appropriated. See Brodsky, Derivative
Suits Based on Inside Information Trading, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1973, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter
cited as Derivative Suits].
18 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1973) (Nos.
73-439, 73-440, 73-495).
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extended this reasoning to hold 10b-5 tippees,19 in a common enter-
prise with their tipper, to be in breach of a similar fiduciary duty to the
corporation in whose securities they traded. The Schein plaintiffs were
shareholders in Lums, Inc., a Florida corporation, and based federal
jurisdiction for their derivative suit on diversity of citizenship. The
complaint alleged that upon realizing that corporate earnings would
be substantially lower than anticipated, 0 Chasen, the president of
Lums, Inc., notified Simon, a Chicago broker employed by Lehman
Brothers, of this development. 21 It further alleged that Simon, in turn,
notified the manager of two mutual funds,22 who sold over 80,000
shares of Lums approximately four hours before the official announce-
ment and suspension of trading,23 Naming all parties to the transaction
as defendants, 24 plaintiffs claimed that they were jointly and severally
liable for the profits amassed as a result of their misuse of corporate
information.25 Without alleging any prior agreement by the defen-
dants, plaintiffs claimed breach of a duty owed to them.
In the district court, Judge Tyler dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.26 On appeal, the Second Circuit re
versed and remanded.27 Guided by the doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
19 See Recodification, supra note 7 at 708-09.
20478 F.2d at 820. In November, 1969, Chasen addressed a seminar of some sixty
investors and predicted earnings of $1.00 to $1.10 per share for the fiscal year ending July 1,
1970. On January 5, 1970, he learned that the earnings would be only about $.76 per share.
Id.
21id.2 2 Simon notified defendant Sit, who in turn notified defendant Jundt. Both Sit and
Jundt were employees of Investors Diversified Services, Inc. (IDS). IDS was a distributor and
investment advisor for a number of mutual funds. IDS employed Sit and Jundt to manage
the portfolios of Investor Variable Payment Fund, Inc. and IDS New Dimensions Fund,
Inc. Both funds as well as IDS were named as defendants. 478 F.2d at 820.
23 Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc. sold 43,000 shares of Lums while IDS New
Dimensions Fund, Inc. sold 40,000 shares. Both sales occured at approximately 10:30 a.m.,
Friday, Jan. 9, 1970, and realized a price of about $17.50 a share. At 1:80 p.m. trading was
suspended pending the official announcement which was made at 2:45 p.m. on Monday,
Jan. 12, 1970. When trading resumed, Lums dosed at $14.00, a drop of approximately
$3.50. 478 F.2d at 820-21.
24 Plaintiffs named as defendants Chasen, IDS, Lehman Brothers, Investors Variable
Payment Fund, Inc., Simon, IDS New Dimensions Fund, Inc., Sit, Jundt, and Lums, Inc.
Judge Tyler of the Southern District of New York dismissed plaintiff's suit as to Sit, Jundt
and Chasen, under rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. § 313, 302(a) (McKinney 1972).
Gildenhorn v. Lums, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 331 n.1, 834, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir4 1973). Plaintiff did not appeal
this dismissal. Simon had also moved below for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds but
his motion was not decided, 478 F.2d at 819. The Second Circuit declined to consider
Simon's motion on appeal and left it to the trial court on remand.
25 478 F.2d at 821.
20 Gildenhorn v. Lums, Inc., 335 F, Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
27478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Tompkins,2 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's determina-
tion that Florida law governed.29 On reviewing defendants' motion
to dismiss, the court assumed the veracity of the allegations in the
complaint. Here, the panel was faced with the bi-partite question of
whether the "stretch of Diamond"30 extended to the facts before the
court and whether so extended Diamond represented the law of Flor-
ida.3' In finding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action,3 2 the court an-
swered both questions in the affirmative.
Interpreting plaintiffs' contention that corporate information was
28 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 The district court in deciding the conflicts question applied the choice of law rules
of New York. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Derivative actions are generally governed by the law of the state of incorporation. See
Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962)
(Venezuelan law applied in derivative suit on behalf of Venezuelan corporation), and cases
cited therein. Under the "grouping of contacts" test used in tort actions, New York courts
will apply the law of the state having greatest contact with the cause of action. See Bab-
cock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
In Schein the district court reasoned that Lums, a Florida corporation, was at least
theoretically damaged in Florida. 335 F. Supp. at 332. Chasen was a Florida citizen and the
other defendants were residents of various states throughout the Midwest. The only New
York contact was that the transactions occurred on the New York Stock Exchange. As a
result, the court reasoned, both under the grouping of contacts test and the "government
interest" test of Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969),
Florida law would apply and New York would yield to Florida's interest in establishing
and regulating the fiduciary duties of officers of Florida corporations. Compare Kell v.
Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1968), with Arbuthnot v.
Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dep't 1970).
The district court concluded "that under any conceivable test, a New York court would
apply Florida law." 335 F. Supp. at 329. This holding was not appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit. 478 F.2d at 820-21 & n.3.
30 478 F.2d at 822.
31 Id. at 823. Although Diamond expressly held that no allegation of damages to the
corporation was required, plaintiffs here alleged such damages, albeit in a general way.
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to allege damages
with "sufficient particularity." Id. at 824. The court reasoned that Florida law is unclear
on the question but apparently does not require more than a general ad damnum allega-
tion. The court found Palma v. Zerbey, 189 So. 2d 510 (Fla. App. 1966) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 200 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1967), unpersuasive on the question of particularity of damages.
Palma held that the plaintiffs therein had failed to sufficiently allege damages and wrongful
acts on the part of the defendant. Except for Palma, the specific question of particularity
has not been raised. The following decisions, however, make the court's conclusion with
respect to specificity of damages questionable at best.
In James Talcott, Inc. v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. CL 1962), the court rea-
soned that a derivative suit required two distinct allegations: (a) an "act whereby the
corporation was caused to suffer damage," 148 So. 2d at 38, and (b) wrongful refusal of
the corporation to seek redress for such act. The suit was dismissed for lack of the latter.
In Marovek v. Atlantic Hotel, Inc., 148 So. 2d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1963), the court, citing
McDowell, commented on the necessity of alleging damage to the corporation and held
for defendants on plaintiff's failure to prove such damage. See also Gadd v. Peason, 351
F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972), where the court distinguished private actions for personal
injuries and derivative actions for corporate injuries.
The issue over specificity of damages in Schein may well have been avoided had the
Second Circuit taken advantage of Florida's certification statute. See note 39 and accompany-
ing text infra.
82 478 F.2d at 822.
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misused as an allegation of a common enterprise and relying heavily
thereon 3 3 the court reasoned: "Co-venturers of the director who
breaches his duty should be ... subject to the same liabilities as those
of the director himself for the misuse of corporate information." ' 4 It
held that the very receipt of the inside information cloaked the de-
fendants with a fiduciary duty not to utilize or reveal the information.35
In the court's view, the policies which forbade the director from trad-
ing directly could not permit him to evade the reach of Diamond by
passing his information to outsiders.3
Conceding the undesirability of insider trading,37 one must still
question the extent to which the Second Circuit has gone to combat it.
As Judge Kaufman indicated in his dissenting opinion,38 the court
neglected in its interpretation of Florida law to avail itself of the
Florida certification statute. 9 This statute provides an enlightened
83 The court noted that the defendant did not deny the existence of a common enter-
prise, but merely argued that Diamond was inapplicable. 478 F.2d at 822. See notes 20-26
and accompanying text supra. But see Judge Kaufman's dissenting opinion. Id. at 827;
note 84 infra. Of course, since the defendants merely moved to dismiss for plaintiffs' failure
to state a cause of action (F.D. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) and a denial of common enterprise
would raise a question of fact, no such refutation was called for.
34 478 F.2d at 822. The majority had no difficulty finding the existence of the common
enterprise necessary to its opinion. Judge Kaufman argued in his dissent, however, that
such an enterprise is not shown by the plaintiffs' pleadings. The facts "simply do not com-
port with the concept of a joint enterprise" but show only a "seemingly unsolicited and
haphazard revelation of certain information." Id. at 829.
See SEC v. Lums, Inc., CCH FE. SFc. L. REP. 94,134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (SEC action for
injunctive relief based on same events). Judge Tyler's opinion, in Lums, indicated a close
relationship between Simon and Chasen and the existence of an "accommodation between
[them] where Simon would be informed in advance of changes confronting Lums, for the
stated purpose of avoiding the embarrassment of appearing to [his] clients to have failed
to do his homework when such changes were made public." Id. at 94,558. This relation-
ship sprang from Simon's assistance in the sale of a large debenture and the sale of Lums'
stock. Chasen sought and obtained the opinion of counsel that informing Simon would
be permissible. Furthermore, Chasen extracted a promise of confidentiality from Simon.
Since the SEC sought only injunctive relief, a showing of negligence is sufficient. It is
arguable that the more stringent requirement of scienter could not have been met as to
Chasen. See Brodsky, Insider Liability for Leaking Information, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1973, at
4, cols. 7-8.
Since the Second Circuit, in Schein, was dealing with a motion to dismiss, the above
factors were not before the court. However, when the facts are developed on remand, it is
submitted that Judge Kaufman's analysis of the pleadings will be vindicated and no com-
mon enterprise will be found. But see notes 35, 54 infra.
35 478 F.2d at 822-23.
36Id.
37 See note I supra.
58 478 F.2d at 828.
89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) provides:
The supreme court of this state may by rule of court provide that, when it shall
appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeals
of the United States or to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia that
there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the
laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such
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procedure which permits a federal appellate court, when faced with
a question where Florida law is dispositive, to certify the question to
the Florida Supreme Court.40 By failing to resort to this procedure,
the Second Circuit in Schein has enunciated a rule on insider trading
which is of doubtful applicability in the Florida courts.41
Moreover, the court's decision is subject to criticism on general
principles of agency and unjust enrichment. Diamond represented a
significant extension in the law of fiduciary duties by eliminating the
requirement of damage to the corporation. 42 The Schein panel, in
federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of
this state to the supreme court of this state for instruction concerning such ques-
tions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme court of this
state by written opinion may answer.
This section has been implemented by rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules,
The authority to answer certified questions was initially granted the Florida Supreme
Court in 1945 ([1945] Fla. Laws, ch. 23098, § 1 at 1291) but the statute was ignored until
1960. See Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. Mumi L. REv, 413, 425-30
(1962). In Clay v. Sun Ins, Office Ltd., 863 U.S. 207 (1960), the United States Supreme Court
expressed its approval of the Florida certification procedure. The Fifth Circuit was reversed
for passing on the constitutionality of a Florida state law without first determining how
the highest Florida court would resolve the state law question.
The Supreme Court did not consider significant the fact that at the time, rule 4.61 had
not been promulgated. Id. at 212. The Court reasoned that even absent the statute the
doctrine of abstention required avoiding a premature constitutional question, and com-
mented on the "rare foresight" of the Florida legislature. Id. For further commentary on
this unique procedure see Boyd v. Bowman, 455 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1973), and cases cited
therein. See generally Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts
to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 413 (1962); Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A Reexamination to
Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 21 (1969).
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted Schein certiorari, 4g U.S.L.W.
3325 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1973) (Nos. 73-439, 73-440, 73-495), to review the question of the Second
Circuit's neglect of the Florida certification procedure.
4 OSee note 39 supra.
41 Although any interpretation or extension of state law by a federal court is subject
to this characterization, the criticism is particularly appropriate in this instance, By re-
sorting to an "Erie guess," Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1969), rather
than availing itself of the Florida certification statute, the court has created a major and
arguably unnecessary extension of Florida law. There is no evidence that Florida courts
would ever accept the basic rationale of Diamond, let alone extend it to the facts of the
instant case. Even under the law of New York, where the stock transactions occurred, the
decision is a significant extension of the duties of "fiduciaries." Diamond is the furthest a
New York court has gone in the area of insider common law liability and the court there
relied on the policies underlying rule lOb-5 and section 16(b). See notes 2 & 17 supra. In a
case where the policy considerations of 16(b) are not applicable there is no guarantee that
a New York court would so extend Diamond. See Loss, supra note 1, at 1403 who finds
"no guarantee against evasion of 16(b) via trading through friends, relatives, or via mutual
back-scratching."
42 The New York Court of Appeals in Diamond relied on RsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1958), in support of its reasoning that a director has a duty to
account for his profits. This reliance has been criticized on the ground that the Restatement
represents an overly broad proposition not adopted by the courts. Note, A Comparison of
Insider Liability Under Diamond v. Oreamuno and Federal Securities Laws, 11 B.C, IND.
& Com. J. Rgv. 499, 504-05 (1970). But even if the Restatement is an over-generalization, it
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addition to declaring this doctrine to be Florida law has, through the
fiction of a common enterprise,43 eliminated the requirement that the
defendant be enriched.44
Perhaps, the most troublesome problem caused by the court's deci-
sion is the possibility of multiple liability, a question which the court
dismissed in a footnote.45 The standard for damages promulgated in
still requires the existence of profits in the unfaithful fiduciaries. See note 45 and accom-
panying text infra.
4 3 Interestingly, the appellate division in Diamond dismissed the action against those
directors who did not participate in the sales. 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287, 287 N.Y.S.2d S00,
305 (1st Dep't 1968). aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 801 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). The Schein
majority distinguished such a situation from the instant case in that the defendants
herein were "actively engaged in furthering the transaction that resulted in the 'dumping'
of Lures stock rather than just 'acquiescing' in it." 478 F.2d at 822 n.6. Judge Kaufman
attacked this reasoning on the ground that since the acquiescing directors in Diamond were
fiduciaries of the corporation it is incongruous to dismiss as to them and yet "hold liable
a non-fiduciary who did not cause or assist in the breach." Id. at 827 n.3. It is interesting
to note that the Second Circuit has recently held that a non-participating director is not
liable under rule lob-5 absent a showing of scienter. Lanza v. Drexel &c Co., 479 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir. 1973). See p. 405 for detailed treatment of Lanza.
44 RFSrATEmENT OF REsrrrTrION § 201 (1936), provides:
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates con-
fidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice of the
violation of duty, holds upon constructive trust for the beneficiary any profit which
he makes through the use of such information.
(Emphasis added). See RxSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958), cited by the Second
Circuit in Schein, 478 F.2d at 823-24. Both authorities require a profit by the defendant. See,
e.g., Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920);
Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 17 Wash. 2d 591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943); Barnes
v. Eastern Sc W. Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 287 P.2d 929 (1955) (en banc). In Schein,
arguably, the only profit from the breach was distributed to the shareholders. But see
REsTATLMENT OF RysTrruTiON § 1(c) (1936) (broad concept of benefit). However, by using
the fiction of a joint venture, the court has imposed joint and several liability on all par-
ties - even those who, by any standard, received no benefit This is too broad a finding of
joint and several liability.
In Higgins v. Shenango Pottery, 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958), 279 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1961), an unfaithful director formed a limited partnership
which used corporate assets and information in competition with the corporation. The
court held all the partners, even limited partners, jointly and severally liable, reasoning
that the plaintiff had established his case by showing that the partnership had received
the benefits. This result, though it does lend support to the court's approach, can readily
be distinguished because of the statutory characteristics of a partnership. In Higgins, there
was no doubt of the existence of the partnership since it was registered in accordance
with Pennsylvania law. Moreover, limited partners share in profits realized by the partner-
ship even though their risk is limited to their investment.
In Schein, however, the plaintiffs' entire case hinged upon the establishment of a
common enterprise and its joint and several liability. It is submitted that this finding was
unwarranted. See Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 P. 783 (1898), where the court con-
cluded that a joint tort-feasor must receive some benefit before a plaintiff can recover in
unjust enrichment. See also Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 440, 81 Am. Dec. 367 (1862),
45 478 F.2d at 825 n.10.
An additional difficulty posed by the result is the range of liability imposed. Although
the actual standard of lOb-5 liability is itself somewhat elusive, see, e.g., Manne, Rule 10b-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L- RLv. 1206-07 (1970), it seems clear that the requirement of proving a
common enterprise imposes a greater burden on the Schein plaintiff than he would have
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Schein, viewed alone, is a definite improvement over the potentially
open-ended liability under a IOb-5 class action.46 However, the Schein
standard is not the sole measure; an insider is now subject to potential
treble liability, viz., to individuals under Birnbaum, in an SEC pro-
ceeding for disgorgement of profits, 47 and now under Schein. These
liabilities may not be mutually exclusive.48
The court attempted to minimize the danger of multiple liability,
noting that the defendants, knowing of the various actions against
them, were capable of protecting themselves. The court, without
elaborating further referred to "the method employed in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77,
93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) [TGS]... ."49 Just what affirmative action the court
had in mind is somewhat of a mystery. In TGS, 0 an action for dis-
gorgement of profits,81 the court required profits garnered through the
use of inside information to be paid over to the corporation and held in
under lOb-5. Whether mere negligence or scienter is required for lOb-5 liability, see Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299-1309 (2d Cir. 1973), either element will often be easier
to prove than the joint or common enterprise required by Schein.
Once the latter requirement is met, however, it seems evident that Schein spreads a
larger net than lOb-5. In SEC v. Lums Inc., CCH SEC. L. REP. 94,134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the
district court dismissed a lOb-5 action against Lehman Brothers, one of the Schein de-
fendants, on the ground that since they were not aware of the actions of Simon, they were
not "a controlling person" within the context of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that section 20(a) was the exclusive standard and rejected
any argument that liability could be alternatively predicated on the theory of respondeat
superior. But see Multiple Defendants, supra note 6, at 601-08. The court concluded that
the section 20(a) "good faith" defense was available to Lehman Brothers, and that its
failure to supervise Simon raised a close question but did not vitiate the defense. The court
refused to impose "hindsight liability" for Lehman Brothers' failure to prevent the poten-
tial conflicts by overseeing Simon's relationship with Chasen. Id. at f 94,565-568. There
is, however, a possibility that Lehman Brothers will be held liable in Schein for conduct
not within the purview of lOb-5. Thus, once a common enterprise can be shown, a common
law action like Schein offers the advantage of a potentially greater number of defendants
to pay damages.
46 See Brodsky, Inside Information-Triple Headed Liability, N.Y.L.J., July 18, 1973,
at 4, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Inside Information].
47 See note 13 supra.
48 Inside Information, supra note 46, at 1, col. 1. Of course, it is always possible to
incur a potential fourth liability under section 16(b), see note 2 supra. But see Note, The
Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J.
1120, 1140-42 (1950), where the author argues that in comparing l0b-5 and 16(b) liability
there is no double liability but two distinct liabilities incurred by a single violation.
"There is little reason for allowing [the insider] to escape one liability merely because he
has managed to incur another." Id. at 1141. Otherwise 16(b) liability would be limited to
innocent transactions. The author rejects any argument that "profits" under 16(b) are
limited to net profits after deduction of losses in a law suit. Contra, Note, A Comparison of
Insider Liability under Diamond v. Oreamuno and Federal Securities Laws, 11 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 499, 508-13 (1970).
49 478 F.2d at 825 n.10.
50 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
51 Inside Information, supra note 46, at 4, col. 2.
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escrow pending court ordered distribution. Private judgments were to
be satisfied out of this fund with the residue to inure to the corporation.
While application of the TGS procedure to Schein might possibly
resolve the problems inherent in a Schein recovery, it would be incon-
sistent with the purpose of a derivative action. A corporate trust ap-
proach imposes a burden on the corporation which logically can be
justified in a disgorgement proceeding. There the SEC sues to prevent
illicit gains and the overriding purpose is to benefit innocent traders.
Moreover, in TGS the corporation itself was a defendant. This logic
breaks down in a derivative suit, however, where the corporation,
supposedly the plaintiff, receives no benefit from the recovery and is
only burdened with the administration of the fund.52 Perhaps the
Second Circuit recognized that the corporation was not the proper
plaintiff in Schein, and was therefore paving the way for shifting the
recovery from the nominal plaintiff to the party actually injured.5 3 If
so, this approach would be equitable and fair to both plaintiff and
defendant since it guarantees recovery to the injured party while
attempting to avoid multiple liability. Moreover, the damage, if any,
was predicated on the loss of "prestige and good will of the corporation
by the public revelation that the director has been involved in un-
ethical conduct."5 4 Since payment from a fund, administered by the
corporation, to the actually damaged parties would help to restore its
damaged corporate image, it follows that this procedure might make
the corporation whole.
The ultimate effect of Schein on the law of insider trading is
somewhat unclear. The requirement of an express common enterprise
would reduce any deterrent effect to a very limited class of cases. Since
this is likely to be the situation involving the greatest culpability, the
decision provides a useful, albeit narrow, deterrent. However, a broader
reading of the decision is possible. Both the language used by the
Second Circuit, 5 and the ease with which the court found a common
52 See note 13 supra.
53 This could very well be a disincentive to the bringing of a Schein suit. The basic
theory behind a derivative suit is that the shareholder is sufficiently interested in the
corporation to litigate for its benefit. Therefore, when the corporation recovers, the share-
holder will gain indirectly. This is questionable when the corporation, as in Schein, will
not recover, but will only be burdened by administering the funds of others.
65 478 F.2d at 822-23.
55 The court noted that the mere receipt of the inside information "automatically
clothes (the outsiders] with a duty to Lum's not to use the information for their own
selfish advantage." 478 F.2d at 823. Moreover, the court reasoned that in
light of the corporate interest which the Diamond rule is designed to protect,
it is immaterial to the preservation of that interest whether the director trades on
his own account in the corporation's stock or whether he passes on the information
to the outsiders who then trade in the corporation's stock. In either event so long
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enterprise56 may actually suggest the extension of Diamond-Schein lia-
bility to all lOb-5 tippees under a presumption of common enterprise,
or perhaps, without any need to prove common enterprise at all. Al-
though this would provide a much broader deterrent, it is submitted
that such an interpretation would be improper. Even with the require-
ment of a common enterprise, Schein represents a far reaching extension
of the law. Any further extensions would be unwarranted. By limiting
liability to the exceptional cases of true common enterprise, the rami-
fications of Schein will be contained. Any broader prophylactic efforts
against insider trading seem best left to the evolution of federal secu-
rities laws specifically enacted for that purpose.
as the director is involved the prestige and good will of the corporation may be
tarnished by the public revelation that the director has been involved in un-
ethical conduct,
Id. at 822-23.
56 See notes 34-35 supra.
